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Abstract: I introduce an account of when a rule normatively sus -
tains a practice. My basic proposal is that a rule normatively sus-
tains a practice when the value achieved by following the rule ex -
plains why agents continue following that rule, thus establishing 
and sustaining a pattern of activity. I apply this model to practices 
of belief management and identify a substantive normative connec-
tion between knowledge and belief. More specifically, I propose one  
special way that knowledge might set the normative standard for 
belief: knowing is essentially the unique way of normatively sus-
taining cognition and, thereby, inquiry. In this respect, my proposal  
can be seen as one way of elaborating a “knowledge-first” normative  
theory.
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1. Introduction
We value many things. Some are easily obtained, others aren’t. We 
also disvalue many things. Some are easily avoided, others aren’t.  
To obtain or avoid any of these things, we need ways of doing so,  
ways that are good enough to be worth the effort. Worthy ways per-
* This is the penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in Knowledge first  
(Oxford University Press), ed. J. A. Carter, E. C. Gordon, & B. Jarvis. Please 
cite the final, published version if possible.
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sist and unworthy ways perish. Worthy ways of the right sort prolif -
erate, thereby instituting and sustaining practices.
These observations can seem uncontroversial, even bordering 
on platitudinous. But they provide most of the materials needed to  
develop a robust theory of the rules that normatively sustain a prac-
tice. In short, they point toward a theory of what I call sustaining 
rules.
Before proceeding I should clarify what I mean by ‘rule’ and 
‘practice’. A rule is a principle or standard of conduct. Conduct can 
be assessed according to a rule. If you conform to the rule, then  
your conduct is correct according to the rule. If you break the rule,  
then your conduct is incorrect according to the rule. A practice is an 
ongoing way of doing things. Practices are instituted, can persist, 
change, and expire. I’m thinking of practices as concrete patterns of  
actions, held together as patterns by the rules that their agents fol-
low. The rules “hold the practice together,” by analogy to the way  
that water binds together isolated bits of powdered milk into liquid 
milk. A practice could also be thought of as an abstract type, a de -
scription of a series of actions done according to a rule. For con-
venience, I’ll continue speaking of practices as concrete patterns 
rather than abstract types, and of rules sustaining practices thus 
construed. I’ll have more to say about how I’m thinking of practices 
as the discussion unfolds.
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2. The model: a simple and intuitive presentation1
There are six basic elements of the model: agent, goal, rule, achieve -
ment, persistent pattern and explanation.2 A rule sustains a practice 
when the agent follows the rule and achieves what it prescribes, the 
value of which in turn explains why the agent continues following 
the rule, thereby establishing a persistent pattern. In a normatively 
sustained practice, the value achieved through earlier instances of  
rule-following breeds subsequent rule-following. In a word, there is  
reproduction via value produced.
At the risk of oversimplification, it might be helpful to visualize 
the model like so:
The arrows represent explanatory relations. The emergence of a 
persistent pattern in this way just is the emergence of a practice: it 
makes the practice. Generation is the initial, limiting case of sus -
tainment.
Strictly speaking, it is the activity of agents that generates and 
1 The view is partly inspired by Millikan’s (2005) ‘biological model’ of public  
linguistic meanings as ‘stabilizing functions.’ It is also broadly related to 
the theory of ‘domain’ normativity and performance assessment discussed 
in Sosa 2007: chs. 2 and 4, and the project of the primitive enquirer (‘ A’) 
discussed in Williams 1978: pp. 23ff. There are also superficial similarities  
to Alston’s (1991) ‘doxastic practice approach’ to epistemology, though 
deep disagreements divide me and Alston. My thinking on this subject was  
influenced by reading in the summer of 2010 a paper by Benjamin Jarvis,  
entitled ‘Assertion and Advocation’ (unpublished ms).
2 Several of these elements could be plural. More on this below.
Agent +
Goal +
Rule
 →  Achievement   Persistent pattern  →
John Turri  |  4
sustains practices, what we might call sustaining agency. Sustain-
ing agency and sustaining rules are but two sides of the same coin.3 
I aim to illuminate both sides, though it has proven easier for me to 
conduct the discussion directly in terms of rules and allow the 
points about agency enter at the appropriate junctures.
Our powers and abilities equip us to exercise some measure of 
control over outcomes, such that successful outcomes can manifest 
our powers and abilities.4 (For convenience, I’ll often just say either 
‘powers’ or ‘abilities’ instead of mentioning both.) An outcome is 
our achievement if and only if it manifests our abilities. Not every 
successful outcome is an achievement. For example, some are due 
to luck.5 A feasible outcome is one that we can achieve as we are ac-
tually constituted, which requires that we actually have some ability  
to produce it. An infeasible outcome is one that we have no ability 
to produce as we are actually constituted. (An infeasible outcome 
might still be possible, even if we actually have no ability to produce  
it.)
It is trivially true that sustaining rules prescribe a feasible out-
come. For if we couldn’t achieve the prescribed outcome, then sub -
sequent rule-following couldn’t be explained by our previously 
achieving the outcome; and if subsequent rule-following couldn’t be 
explained by our previously achieving the outcome, then we 
couldn’t sustain the practice by following the rule. Of course, the 
3 MacIntyre 1999 has influenced my thinking here.
4 For a partial theory of this relation, see Turri in press.
5 For more on this way of thinking about powers and outcomes, see Sosa 
2007, Sosa 2011, Greco 2010, Turri 2011a, Turri 2011b.
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rule-following behavior might somehow persist even if we achieve 
nothing valuable through it. We might continue on in the same  
hopeless way. And our persistence in such hopeless ways might 
even incidentally cause something valuable to happen to us, per-
haps through blind luck or the intervention of a benevolent and 
merciful higher power. But this wouldn’t amount to us sustaining 
the practice in the sense I’m interested in.
My view about sustaining rules and agency does not commit me 
to any particular view about the rules that constitute the actions 
that occur within a practice. It does not even commit me to the 
view that the actions that occur within a practice are constituted by  
rules.6 From the fact that a practice is sustained by a rule, it does 
not follow that actions occurring within that practice are made pos-
sible by the rule, or indeed by any rule. For example, the practice of  
horse racing involves mounting and riding a horse. But intuitively 
the actions mounting and riding aren’t constituted or made pos-
6 Searle (1969: ch. 2.5) and Williamson (2000: ch. 11) both take a different  
approach to constitutive rules; Rawls (1955: 25) presents a related theory, 
what he calls “the practice conception” of rules, according to which rules 
are “logically prior” to certain actions. One main reason that I don’t offer 
my view as a theory of “constitutive rules” is that the phrase ‘constitutive 
rules’ carries considerable baggage, and I wish to avoid verbal squabbles. 
More importantly, sustaining rules are not “general” or “conventional” 
rules (Williamson 2000: 238–9), “regulative rules” (Searle 1969: 33), or  
“rules of thumb” either (Rawls 1955: 23). Sustaining rules, as I define them,  
differ from all these widely discussed categories. In particular, I am not of-
fering a theory of rules that necessarily “create the possibility of new forms 
of behavior” (Searle 1963: 33) or are “logically prior” to any actions that oc-
cur within the practice. My present purpose is to identify and explain a the-
ory of sustaining rules and aside from ensuring that what I’m doing is not  
confused with what Rawls, Searle, Williamson and others have tried to do, 
I lack the space to compare the approaches.
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sible by the rules of horse racing. Rather, they are antecedently  
given actions that the practice of horse racing incorporates into 
more complex patterns of activity.
3. Refinement and elaboration
Having presented the basic model, in this section I include some 
finer points and qualifications to further clarify the view. I include 
these refinements and qualifications at this point in order to fore-
stall common questions and misconceptions. Those uninterested in 
such refinements can skip to section 4.
Not all ways of sustaining a practice are ways of normatively 
sustaining it. My theory applies to both ways of sustaining a prac-
tice, but I’m really interested in the latter. Normatively sustained 
practices have genuine reason-giving force, at least for their practi-
tioners: practitioners have good reason to achieve what the rules 
prescribe. But what distinguishes normatively sustained practices 
in this way? Every practice has a point, which can be identified with  
that goal, achievement of which explains why practitioners persist 
in following the rule. (I don’t intend to mark an important distinc-
tion between a point and a goal. They are both just objectives or  
ends. I often use ‘point’ for a practice and ‘goal’ for agents, to help 
keep straight the different elements of the model.) But not all goals 
are good. A normatively sustained practice has a good point, which 
explains its reason-giving force.
The practice’s point needn’t be intrinsically or necessarily good 
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in order to imbue it with reason-giving force. It is enough, I think, 
that the point is usually good, all things considered, in some way or 
another under normal circumstances. In a word, the point need 
only be ordinarily good. Consider preventing tooth decay, which is 
the point of the practice of brushing your teeth daily. Preventing 
tooth decay is instrumentally good in normal circumstances be-
cause in those circumstances it tends to promote better health, 
which tends to promote greater happiness. This explains why we 
have a reason to follow the rule brush your teeth daily. Preventing 
tooth decay is only contingently instrumentally good. In some 
strange circumstances, it would be instrumentally bad to prevent 
tooth decay — e.g. a situation in which all people without rotten  
teeth are tortured to death, or in which our teeth rot as part of a 
natural and healthy exfoliation process. Nevertheless, although I 
think that a liberal approach on this point is advisable, it is consist -
ent with the basic model to impose stricter requirements on the  
point of a normatively sustained practice.
In order for a rule to sustain a practice, practitioners needn’t  
succeed every time that they engage in the practice or attempt to 
follow the rule. They needn’t even succeed most of the time. They 
need only succeed enough of the time for the practice to sustain it -
self through the value it brings. Depending on the point of the prac-
tice, very infrequent success could be enough. The practice of dia-
mond hunting and other forms of prospecting are like this. And as  
examples of such practices show, the involvement of later parties in  
a practice might be explained by the benefits achieved through the  
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rule-following of previous parties long ago. For example, a family 
might engage in the practice of diamond prospecting over many 
generations and succeed only once in a century. Nevertheless, the  
benefits earned are enough to sustain the pattern of rule-following 
of family members in between successes.
Not all rule-following sustains a practice in the sense I’m inter -
ested in. In particular, repeated but isolated rule-following that fails  
to explain further instances of similar behavior doesn’t sustain a 
practice. For example, suppose that we are consistently convinced 
by a different person with a different reason each day to hang our  
laundry out to dry, and the benefit of doing this previously doesn’t 
explain why we do it subsequently. Even though we frequently fol-
low the rule hang the laundry out to dry, and we benefit from do-
ing so, this is not a normatively sustained laundering practice or 
even, in the sense I’m interested in, a practice at all. There is no “re -
production value” here. Someone observing our daily actions might 
reasonably infer that we had instituted a laundering practice, but  
that is because in this case outward appearances are misleading. By 
contrast, if we had as our goal saving energy, and we followed the 
rule hang the laundry out to dry and thereby achieved energy sav-
ings, and this benefit explained why we continued following the rule  
and reaping the benefit, then it would be a normatively sustained 
laundering practice. Here we have reproduction through the value 
produced.
Closely related to this last point, continued rule-following beha -
vior must have an appropriate etiology in order for it to constitute a 
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practice. Even if a set of activities follows the exact same rule in ex -
actly the same way, it doesn’t follow that they are instances of a 
single practice. Practices are like biological species in this respect.  
Specimens must share a proper evolutionary etiology to be conspe-
cifics. Even if a group of specimens share all their gross morpholo-
gical features, it doesn’t follow that they form a species. They might 
still be a cryptic species. Moreover, practices that prescribe out-
wardly similar behavior in a wide range of circumstances might still  
be very different due to differences in their rules. Again, the com -
parison to biological species is helpful: two species might be very 
different genetically (follow different “genetic rules”) despite being 
outwardly similar due to convergent evolution.
In light of the points made in the last two paragraphs, I find it  
very plausible that even though practices are uncontroversially arti-
ficial in an important sense of that term, they nevertheless have an  
underlying nature that is partly determined by their history. In this  
respect they are importantly similar to natural kinds.7
Some practices are intentionally designed, but they needn’t be.  
Many important practices are not intentionally designed. For ex-
ample, the practice of assertion was not intentionally designed.  
Neither were the chimpanzee practices of smashing open nuts with 
rocks or using straws to extract termites from crevices. Again, we 
might compare practices to species, which can be intentionally de -
signed through husbandry or genetic engineering, even though 
7 This is in keeping with the most influential contemporary scientific work 
on human norms, culture and evolution (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005, 
Tomasello 2008, 2009).
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most have evolved without intentional design through natural selec-
tion.
Goals can be complex and difficult to identify precisely. Often 
we don’t just want some particular kind of thing, but rather that 
kind of thing without any admixture of another particular type of  
disvaluable thing, both in this specific case and also in the long run.  
The importance of avoiding disvaluable admixture will partly de-
termine the shape of any sustainable practice organized around the  
goal.
Powers and abilities needn’t be infallible. Indeed, virtually none 
is infallible. A power or ability enables you to achieve a certain res -
ult in a certain environment. It might enable you to achieve the res-
ult on fifty percent of attempts in a normal environment, on ten  
percent of attempts in an especially hostile environment, and on 
ninety percent of attempts in an especially hospitable environment. 
From the fact that you sometimes fail to, say, flip the switch when 
you try, it doesn’t follow that you lack the ability to flip the switch.  
Neither does it follow that you have power only over whether you 
try to flip the switch. You still have the power to flip the switch. It’s  
just not an infallible power.
Getting lucky is a way of getting what we want and it is, trivi-
ally, good to have good luck. But, equally trivially, getting lucky is  
not a way of achieving success, and so not a way of sustaining a  
practice. Achievement is the antithesis of lucky success. Achieve-
ment is success manifesting ability, and the extent to which success 
manifests our ability is inversely proportional to how lucky we get. 
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Consistent with this, there could be cases where some combination 
of luck and ability conspire to bring success. Indeed, most actual  
cases of success are probably like this. Success is often a matter of 
degree, as can be the extent to which it manifests our abilities. I will  
abstract away from these complications and speak as if these were  
dichotomous matters.
Not all rule-following is conscious or explicitly intentional. In 
fact, I think that most rule-following is instead habitual and auto -
matic, in the sort of way that North American drivers drive on the 
right side of the road. North Americans habitually, mechanically  
follow the rule drive on the right side. They don’t consciously reflect 
on it or wake up in the morning and form an explicit intention to 
drive on the right side today.
Closely connected to the previous point, it’s worth noting that 
we typically practice ways of doing things so that they become 
“second nature” — that is, so that we conduct ourselves that way 
“without thinking,” and especially without consciously deliberating 
or explicitly formulating and executing an intention. ‘Practice’ in  
this sense, a synonym of ‘rehearse’, is clearly closely related to the 
sense of ‘practice’ relevant to my view of how rules sustain prac-
tices, a synonym of ‘customary procedure’ or ‘routine’. It is through 
rehearsal that things become routine: by practice is practice estab-
lished.8
8 There are potentially interesting points of convergence here with how Aris-
totle characterizes moral virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. Writes Aristo-
tle, “Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit” (Aristotle 350 BCE, 
Book 2.1, 16-17).
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Practitioners must be implicitly sensitive to the rules of the 
practice, otherwise they couldn’t follow the rule as opposed to  
merely conform with it. I take no positive stand on what form such  
sensitivity must take or what makes it true that such sensitivity is  
present. But it’s clear that sensitivity doesn’t require being able to 
explicitly formulate the rules. Practitioners needn’t be especially 
good judges of what the rules are, even if we expect patterns in their 
behavior to offer helpful clues to what the rules are. (Actions speak  
louder than words.) Practitioners might not be explicitly aware of  
the rules that they’re following, or that they’re engaging in the prac -
tice that they’re engaged in. They might even sincerely judge them-
selves to not be engaged in a practice that they regularly engage in.  
Plausibly, at least some people engaged in contemporary racist or 
sexist practices are like this. It is possible that observers of a prac-
tice are better positioned than the participants to discover what the  
rules are.
I’m not offering a theory of rule-following. I assume that people 
do follow rules and I take this assumption to be uncontroversial.
4. An example: Robin Hood and his merry men
This section presents, and the following three sections discuss, a toy 
example illustrating the model.
Robin Hood and his Merry Men:
When Robin was a young lad, he witnessed a curious event that  
left a lasting impression. Just outside a poor village at the edge of 
the forest, a bold group of criminals robbed a very wealthy noble-
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man who was transporting his treasures. As they made their get-
away, out of exuberance and without design, the criminals tossed 
some of the stolen treasure along the road in the village. The peas-
ants retrieved it and felt very obliged. When the Sheriff arrived to 
investigate, none of the peasants revealed what they knew, 
namely, who the criminals were and which direction they fled. In-
stinctive gratitude led them to remain silent.
The criminals robbed from the rich and “gave” to the poor. 
But this wasn’t their practice. It was an isolated event and they 
weren’t in any way aiming at what turned out to be, from their per-
spective, a very fortunate outcome.
Years later when Robin was a man, he became disillusioned 
with the unjust distribution of wealth in the English feudal system. 
He desired greater distributive justice in the local economy. Robin 
recalled the successful robbery he witnessed as a young lad. The 
lesson of that robbery stuck with him and inspired his incipient 
plan to enhance distributive justice: rob from the rich and give to 
the poor. Robin recruited a group of like-minded merry men and 
set up in Sherwood Forest. They robbed rich people traveling 
through the forest and gave the windfall to the poor, retaining 
enough to pay their expenses and sustain their redistributive en-
terprise. The local population benefitted greatly from this and ad-
ored Robin and his merry men because of it. Consequently, the 
locals refused to cooperate with the Sheriff of Nottingham’s effort 
to imprison Robin and his merry men. Things continued this way 
for a long time.
Here we have a normatively sustained practice: the practice of  
Robin Hoodery. An initial application of the model to it might go as 
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follows. The agents are Robin and his gang. Their goal is greater 
distributive justice, which is a good thing. The relevant abilities in-
clude their thieving skills.9 The rule is, roughly, rob from the rich  
and give to the poor. They follow this rule and achieve the goal, 
which in turn explains why they persist in this pattern of behavior, 
thus instituting and sustaining the practice.
If Robin Hoodery is to be sustained, then its rules — call them 
Robin’s Rules — will be more complicated than the initial formula-
tion just suggested. The merry men must also not undermine their 
support in the community by, for example, also robbing from poor 
people. If they rob everybody they encounter, rich and poor alike, 
then their support in the community will be undermined, which will  
very shortly lead to their demise. Robin’s Rules will also instruct  
them to avoid this disvaluable admixture of results. At the same 
time, it’s implausible that the merry men would be engaging in the 
practice incorrectly by not constantly robbing, and presumably the 
rules should reflect this. Here, then, is one plausible suggestion for  
a set of rules for Robin Hoodery:
Robin’s Rules
Robin’s Imperfect Duty: Not infrequently, rob a traveler.
Robin’s Rule of Permission: You may rob a traveler only if 
9 I’m eliding some real but minor complications for the sake of clarity and 
simplicity. The peasants also play a role in the practice, even if their parti-
cipation is mainly passive, and their behavior is prescribed by rules of the  
practice pertaining to gratitude and complicity. The number of abilities is 
actually surprisingly many, as is fitting for a complicated activity like or-
ganized thievery.
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the traveler is rich.10
Robin’s Perfect Duty: You must distribute the plunder to the 
local poor, less the necessary and appropriate overhead 
costs of the redistributive activity.
Prevailing conditions of human existence demand that a suc-
cessful plan have some flexibility. Lack of precision is the cost of 
flexibility. Robin’s Rules aren’t perfectly precise. What counts as 
not infrequently will depend on how much redistribution is needed 
to keep the local population on Robin’s side. What counts as neces-
sary and appropriate overhead will likewise vary and be determ-
ined by such things as the costs associated with robbing travelers 
(e.g. the right kinds of weaponry, disguises, and other equipment) 
and maintaining the merry men’s living quarters and health. Atti-
tudes of the local poor will also influence what is appropriate. For  
example, if Robin and his merry men start retaining enough to live 
a lavish lifestyle, then it might alienate their allies and lead to their  
demise. Plausibly there is no unique right way to set values for these 
variables in the plan. Vigilance will be required to keep the values 
within appropriate ranges. Appropriate attention to environmental 
factors will shape how Robin and his merry men adjust the values 
10 Alternatively: Avoid robbing non-rich travelers. Avoidance could be under-
stood as a matter of degree, in which case the rule needn’t forbid the rob -
bing of any non-rich traveler; instead, it might require only that non-rich 
travelers not exceed a certain proportion of overall travelers robbed. As will 
be noted several times in subsequent footnotes, I am sympathetic to rules 
requiring only that participants’ activity be marked by certain central tend-
encies. I include these points in footnotes because it’s important to flag that 
the model is flexible in this way. At the same time, I relegate these points  
footnotes because I want to keep the proposals in the main text un-
cluttered.
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as their practice unfolds. Otherwise put, the relevant environmental 
factors remotely condition an effective interpretation of the rules 
and thereby the practice.11
Robin’s Rules prescribe certain outcomes. The merry men have 
no power to make these outcomes just happen, or happen by luck, 
or happen by magic. They can achieve these outcomes only by exer-
cising their ability to produce the outcomes. There simply is no  
other way for them to do it. And it is by achieving these things that  
the merry men achieve what the rules prescribe and thereby achieve  
the goal of the practice, namely, greater distributive justice. Greater  
distributive justice is their achievement, an outcome that manifests 
their skill, effort and agency. And the value of their achievements  
breeds further activity of the same sort.
5. Success and evidence
I am often asked why Robin’s Rules aren’t framed in terms of evid-
ence, such as the following alternative for a permission rule:
Robin’s Evidential Rule of Permission: You may rob a trav-
eler only if you have good evidence to believe that the 
traveler is rich.
Here good evidence does not guarantee that the traveler is rich, but 
it does make it probable.12
11 This idea is inspired by Ben Jarvis’s work on “distal shaping” (unpublished 
ms). Jarvis expressed some concern about my use of ‘distal shaping’ in the  
present context, so I switched to ‘remote conditioning’ to pick out the re-
lated phenomenon described in the main text.
12 In my experience, this sort of alternative gets posed by those who favor a 
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This is an important suggestion providing an opportunity to ex-
plain two other features of sustaining rules, namely, what sort of  
rules are most eligible to be sustaining rules, and how sustaining  
rules give rise to derivative rules of a practice. In the remainder of  
this section, I discuss the former feature; in the following two sec-
tions, I discuss the latter.
Evidential rules can have an important derivative place in a  
practice, but they are inferior to what I call direct success rules as 
candidates for sustaining rules. But before getting to that, I’d like to  
first point out that although there is a fairly natural evidential sub-
stitute for Robin’s Rule of Permission, there is no natural evidential  
substitute for  the others. Consider:
Robin’s Imperfect Evidential Duty: Not infrequently, do 
something that you have good evidence to believe is rob-
bing a traveler.
Robin’s Perfect Evidential Duty: You must do something 
that you have good evidence to believe is distributing 
the plunder to the local poor, less the necessary and ap-
propriate overhead costs of the redistributive activity.
Given how unnatural these are, it seems unlikely that a thoroughgo-
ing commitment to evidential substitutes will be attractive. In light 
of this, and in order to give the alternative evidential approach the  
best run for its money, I’ll focus on the more natural evidential per-
non-factive conception of good evidence, so I entertain it accordingly. For 
work investigating how closely this tracks the ordinary way of evaluating  
evidence, see Turri 2015; Turri in press c.
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mission rule.
Robin’s Rule of Permission is a better candidate for a sustaining 
rule because it is a direct success rule. Direct success rules directly 
prescribe the goal. Evidential rules do not. Instead, evidential rules 
prescribe something that you have evidence to believe will count as 
satisfying the goal. The difference is critical. Consistently following 
Robin’s Evidential Rule of Permission could directly undermine the 
practice. Despite following the rule, the merry men might still rob 
many poor people and thereby alienate their allies, which under 
prevailing conditions will effectively end the practice of Robin 
Hoodery. This would happen if the merry men’s evidence was con-
sistently enough misleading. However, consistently following a sus-
taining rule would not undermine a practice. Indeed, just the op-
posite. In line with this, consistently following Robin’s Rule of Per-
mission wouldn’t undermine Robin Hoodery, but would instead 
help sustain it. This is because it is a direct success rule.
When I say that direct success rules directly prescribe the goal,  
this is an oversimplification due largely to the potential complexit -
ies of goals. Strictly speaking, it is only a practice’s entire set of sus -
taining rules that must directly prescribe the goal. That is, the set of  
sustaining rules, taken as a whole, will have enough content to pre -
scribe the goal. Robin’s Rules form such a set for Robin Hoodery.  
Individual rules within the set might merely prescribe things that 
are, at least given prevailing conditions, partly constitutive of or in-
strumental to the goal of the practice. For example, Robin’s Rule of  
Permission by itself isn’t enough to specify the goal of Robin 
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Hoodery , and following it isn’t enough to sustain the practice.
6. Heuristics and evidence
What role do evidential rules play in a practice, if not as sustaining 
rules? They function derivatively as heuristics and as standards of  
criticism. I discuss heuristics in this section and standards of criti-
cism in the next section.
Heuristics are important and useful. A heuristic is intended as a  
convenient substitute for its correlative direct success rule. If the  
direct success rule prescribes S, then a correlative heuristic would 
prescribe H, where achieving H (1) is at least typically easier than 
achieving S, and (2) correlates well enough with achieving S. (For  
convenience I’ll call a heuristic’s correlative direct success rule its 
superior rule.) The strength of the correlation determines the qual-
ity of the heuristic. Following a good heuristic is a good way of ap-
proximating the results of following the superior rule. If the heur-
istic is good enough, then following it might even be a way of fol-
lowing its superior rule. In light of this, we might call heuristics in-
direct success rules for a practice.
Nevertheless, their usefulness and importance can’t conceal the 
fact that even good heuristics are parasites. A heuristic’s place and 
importance in a practice derives entirely from that of its superior  
rule. If a once good and popular heuristic becomes bad due to some 
change in the environment, then we would expect its popularity to  
diminish over time among practitioners committed to the superior 
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rule. And if a better heuristic was discovered, over time committed 
practitioners would abandon the old heuristic and adopt the new 
one. The change of preference for one heuristic over the other is ex-
plained by the primary importance of the underlying superior rule. 
And it is the enduring commitment to the underlying superior rule 
that explains why we have continuity of practice across the more su-
perficial change of heuristics. This is similar to the way that, in cor -
porate or military planning, an improvement in tactics is under-
stood by reference to continuity in the underlying strategy that the 
tactics are intended to implement.
Notice something important but easily overlooked. Heuristics 
are also direct success rules in their own right. This might sound 
paradoxical initially, but a moment’s reflection reveals that it is  
trivially true. A heuristic tells you directly to do something too. If 
you don’t do it, then you break the rule and your conduct is incor-
rect according to the heuristic.
Even if it’s easier to follow a heuristic than its superior rule, it  
still might not be easy to follow the heuristic. There can also be  
heuristics for heuristics, so there might be a temptation to keep 
finding heuristics that are easier and easier to follow, until we reach  
rules that we can infallibly follow whenever we choose. However,  
the relation x is a good heuristic for y isn’t transitive, because the 
relation x correlates well with y isn’t transitive. From the fact that 
H* correlates well with H, and H correlates well with S, it doesn’t  
follow that H* correlates well with S.
Returning now to Robin’s Evidential Rule of Permission, I think 
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that it functions as a heuristic in the practice of Robin Hoodery. (A 
better name for it would be ‘Robin’s Permission Heuristic’.) Robin 
and his men might use evidence of wealth as a proxy for wealth, but 
the evidential rules are still derivative and parasitic. This fits the 
pattern of a heuristic in subordinate position to its correlative direct 
success rule.
To illustrate the point, suppose that the prevailing fashion 
around Sherwood is as follows: all and only rich people wear purple 
robes, whereas all and only poor people wear green rags. Further  
suppose that this is common knowledge. Since the color of 
someone’s robe is typically much easier to detect than their net  
worth, this provides Robin and his men with a convenient heuristic 
for selecting eligible travelers to rob: rob a traveler only if the trav-
eler wears a purple robe.
Now suppose that fashions change without Robin and his merry 
men hearing about it. The local rich people suspect that they’re be-
ing marked for robbery because of their purple robes. So they de-
cide to give away their vast quantities of purple robes to the local  
poor, who are more than happy to wear them; the rich people the 
begin wearing green rags instead. Now when Robin and his merry 
men rob purple-robed travelers, they are robbing poor people — 
and, perhaps, then giving to the rich in green rags! They are break-
ing Robin’s Rule of Permission, but they are following Robin’s Per-
mission Heuristic. Will this conduct sustain Robin Hoodery?
No, it obviously won’t. Their actions destabilize the practice and  
even threaten to undermine it entirely. If Robin Hoodery is to per-
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sist, then Robin and his merry men will have to alter their behavior, 
bringing it back in line with the Rule of Permission. In the process, 
if they are wise, they will also adjust their views about what consti-
tutes evidence of wealth. They will interpret the Permission Heur-
istic in light of what counts as correct observance of the Rule of Per-
mission. Moreover, if given a choice between having their behavior 
conform to the Rule of Permission or the Permission Heuristic,  
committed practitioners will choose the former. In light of all this, I 
submit that the Rule of Permission helps to sustain Robin Hoodery, 
whereas the Permission Heuristic is just that, a heuristic.
7. Criticism and evidence
Now let’s turn to standards of criticism. Here I mean ‘criticism’ in  
the negative sense of ‘expressing disapproval’ or ‘fault finding’, 
rather than the more neutral sense of ‘evaluation’. Standards of cri-
ticism, in the relevant sense, are actually standards of punishment, 
mild though it may be. Telling someone that they did something 
bad or wrong is, in effect, to impose a mild verbal penalty for their  
behavior.
Many practices involve cooperation among people in different 
roles. When people’s fates are intertwined, it makes sense to have 
ways of influencing others to avoid incorrect behavior. Criticism is 
one way of influencing others. Thus it makes sense that social prac-
tices will involve standards of criticism, enabling participants to ef-
fectively influence associates by negatively reinforcing correct beha-
23  |  Sustaining rules
vior.
From the fact that someone breaks a rule, it doesn’t follow that  
criticizing them or their action is appropriate. If criticism won’t im -
prove behavior — or worse, if it will lead to more rule-breaking, or 
cause some other serious damage — then it would be dysfunctional 
for a practice to condone such criticism. A well functioning practice  
will tend to condone criticism only if, and to the extent that, it is in -
strumental in promoting the goals of the practice.
What will promote the goals of the practice is typically a contin -
gent matter. Humans tend to resent criticism of incorrect behavior 
that the agent had good reason to think was correct. Thus we would 
expect successful human practices to reflect this fact by incorporat -
ing standards of criticism that place a premium on the agent’s evid -
ence at the time of action. We typically excuse people from criticism 
when they had good reason to believe that their action was correct, 
even if it wasn’t.13
Standards of criminal liability often display just this pattern. 
For example, common law typically requires an objective violation 
of a rule (actus reus) and an understanding that the conduct would 
violate a rule (mens rea) in order for someone to be legally guilty 
and thus subject to punishment. Proving that you had good evid-
ence that your conduct was legal is enough to avoid guilt, because it  
is enough to invalidate a claim of mens rea. There are many excep-
tions to this and a host of other technical legal issues threaten to  
13 For experimental verification of this empirical claim, see Turri 2013; Turri 
and Blouw 2014.
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crowd in almost immediately. But for my purposes it’s enough to 
note this central tendency in the law as a way of illustrating the phe-
nomenon I’m describing. Breaking the law is considered necessary 
but (usually) insufficient to warrant a penalty.
Of course, following some rules, such as those forbidding the 
killing of innocents, might be so important to us that we’re willing  
impose punishment for breaking them at all (for further discussion, 
see the papers collected in Simester 2005). We hold people strictly  
accountable for breaking such rules and do not excuse them, re -
gardless of their evidence. But strict accountability is the exception 
in human practice, not the rule.
Standards of criticism clearly play an important role in human  
practices. But standards of criticism aren’t suitable to hold a prac-
tice together, so they’re not good candidates for sustaining rules.  
Escaping criticism can be a good thing but it’s not the sort of thing  
that explains why a practice persists. As an analogy, consider a fam -
ily consisting of a mother, father and children. The parents have a  
duty to provide food for the children: the First Family Rule is par-
ents must give their children daily bread. If the parents consist-
ently provide bread to the children (‘sustenance’ in one sense), then 
they’re following the rules and this contributes to the family’s con -
tinued existence (‘sustenance’ in another sense). By contrast, con-
sider the evidential substitute, the First Family Evidential Rule: 
parents must do something that they have good reason to believe 
constitutes giving their children daily bread. If the parents consist-
ently escape criticism for not providing bread to the children — be-
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cause, say, most things that appeared to be bread were just a bunch  
of nutritionless lookalikes made from ash, water and artificial fla-
voring — then their conduct won’t contribute to the family’s contin-
ued existence, even though they’re following the evidential rule. In-
deed, before long their conduct will ensure the family’s demise.  
Only objective success in providing sustenance can sustain the fam-
ily.
Returning now to the evidential substitutes for Robin’s Rules, I 
propose that in addition to functioning as heuristics, they also help 
set standards of criticism. Following Robin’s Permissibility Heur-
istic (i.e. the Evidential Rule of Permission) exempts the merry men  
from criticism for their actions, even though it doesn’t set the stand-
ard for permissible conduct.
Recall the imagined situation in which it was common know-
ledge that all and only rich people wore purple robes. Robin and his  
men know this, so they have good evidence that by robbing a 
purple-robed traveler, they are acting permissibly. But then the rich 
secretly decided to give away their purple robes to the poor and 
wear green rags instead. Now if Robin robs a purple-robed traveler, 
he acts impermissibly. But others would be reluctant to criticize  
him for this mistake (at least initially). That’s because he was fol -
lowing the Permissibility Heuristic, which puts his action beyond  
appropriate criticism.
In general, where there is a human social practice with sustain -
ing rule R, and H is commonly employed by practitioners as a good  
heuristic for R, then we would expect there to be a derivative stand-
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ard of criticism, C, to the effect that agents are generally exempt  
from criticism if they follow H but thereby violate R.14
8. Belief management
We have ongoing ways of managing our beliefs. Supposing that be-
lief management is a normatively sustained practice, what can the 
present model tell us about it?
It is a familiar idea that the point of belief management involves 
believing truths and not believing falsehoods.15 Either goal on its 
own is easy enough to accomplish, but their combination can make 
belief management challenging. If the only goal were to believe  
truths, then believe everything would be a good rule to follow. Like-
wise, if the only goal were to avoid falsehoods, then believe nothing 
would be a good rule to follow. But following either of these rules 
would do us no good; nor would it sustain the practice of belief  
management. Indeed, it would be a total disaster! We want true be -
liefs, but without a harmful admixture of falsehood. In the abstract,  
it is difficult to say precisely how to correctly balance these twin  
goals, but no one doubts that belief management aims at some mix 
of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods.
Belief management might also aim at acquiring beliefs that 
serve other purposes. These might not be prototypical cases of be-
neficial belief management, but not only are they possible, they al -
14 My views on this are partly inspired by Williamson’s (2000: 256) distinc-
tion between the impermissible and the reasonable, and DeRose’s (2002: 
180) related distinction between primary and secondary propriety.
15 E.g. James 1897, DePaul 2001, and David 2005.
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most certainly actually happen. Athletes work themselves into the 
false belief that they are better than their opponent, so that they  
perform better; scientists focus intently on the virtues of their in-
ductive theories and ignore the problem of the pessimistic meta-in-
duction from the history of science; religious fanatics find ways to 
convince themselves that the evidence for evolution is an elaborate 
hoax, so that they can sleep better; free-market fundamentalists 
manage to continue believing that no government regulation of 
commerce has good consequences, so they don’t have to admit to  
themselves the error of their ways; people who overestimate their 
competence tend to be more confident and better performers as a 
result; etc.
I accept that belief management could also aim at these out -
comes and that such outcomes can benefit us and thereby help to  
sustain the practice of belief management. Although I remain open 
to the possibility that such outcomes shouldn’t be counted as bene-
fits of belief management per se but of some other practice instead, 
I don’t find that suggestion very plausible. More generally, I find it 
implausible that the sustaining rules of belief management will ne-
cessarily disallow or discourage such outcomes. Consequently, I will 
propose an application of the model to the practice of belief man-
agement, assuming that these non-truth-directed outcomes pro-
mote the goal of belief management and bring value that helps sus-
tain the practice.
One way to handle all of this is to posit distinct practices of be-
lief management. One central practice is what I call position man-
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agement. The goal of this practice is to equip us with beliefs needed  
to accomplish our goals and continue in a suitable way of life — that 
is, to help position us for success. We might need to accept or reject 
certain things just to get our projects off the ground or keep them 
going. If science would stall unless we believed that the pessimistic  
meta-induction from the history of science is fatally flawed, then we 
are well served to get ourselves to believe as much. More generally, 
if cognition would stall unless we believed that we know that our  
fundamental belief-forming processes are reliable, then we have an 
interest in getting ourselves to believe that. For those who would 
fall into despair and ruin without the crutch of supernatural reli -
gious beliefs, they are prudent to keep themselves believing such 
things. Again, the point of believing any of these things would be to  
help position us for success. Such positioning can pertain to global 
matters, as with the reliability of our basic belief-forming processes, 
or to exceedingly local matters, as with a cancer patient who needs  
to believe, “The odds are good that I’ll survive this illness,” in order 
to keep things together and have a chance at survival. Position man-
agement is a purely strategic belief management practice; whether 
the beliefs are true is beside the point. The point is effective posi-
tioning.
Another central belief management practice is what I call in-
quiry management, which itself seems to divide into at least two 
further practices. One side of inquiry is attention management. 
Which questions should we consider? And which of these deserve 
more of our time and energy? There is no point in considering ques-
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tions useless to us, or in devoting more time and energy to a ques -
tion than it deserves. We could be the best truth-detectors in the  
world, but that wouldn’t matter if we never considered worthy ques-
tions. Acquiring worthless things won’t sustain a practice. Attention 
management is also a strategic belief management practice, con -
cerned with aiming cognition in the right direction. Its point is to  
set an appropriate cognitive agenda.
The other side of inquiry is truth-detection, o r cognition 
proper. The goals and rules of position management don’t apply 
here. And once a question has been considered, attention manage-
ment has done its work, for better or worse. The only concern at  
this point is whether P is true. The aim of cognition is twofold: get 
the correct answer and avoid the incorrect answer. Getting the cor -
rect answer means believing P, if P is true, and believing not-P, if P  
is false. Avoiding the incorrect answer means not believing P, if P is  
false, and not believing not-P, if P is true.
What are the sustaining rules of belief management? The point 
of belief management in general is to acquire useful beliefs. This is 
a very broad goal, but that is appropriate because belief manage -
ment is a very broad practice serving our interests across the whole 
range of life’s activities. Call any belief, true or false, that benefits us  
a useful belief. Just as robbing some travelers was required to sus-
tain the practice of Robin Hoodery, the formation of some beliefs 
will be required to sustain the practice of belief management. So at 
least one of the rules of belief management will be:
Belief’s Imperfect Duty: Not infrequently, form a belief.
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Forming useless beliefs won’t sustain the practice, so we should also 
expect a rule of this form:
Belief’s Rule of Permission: You may believe P only if believ-
ing P is useful.16
But as we have seen, beliefs can be useful in different ways. 
They can be useful because they position us to proceed and perform 
well enough. The practice of position management looks after that. 
And they can be useful because they are correct answers to ques-
tions that matter. The practice of inquiry management looks after  
that.
What are the rules of position management? Whether the belief  
is true is beside the point for this practice. Focusing for the moment  
on the most serious cases where the presence or absence of certain  
beliefs would immobilize us, two rules of this practice might be:
Positional Rule of Permission 1: You may believe P only if 
believing P will not immobilize you.
Positional Rule of Permission 2: You may refrain from be-
lieving P only if doing so will not immobilize you.
The practice might also incorporate standing recommendations:
Positional Recommendation 1: To the extent that believing P 
will help you, it is recommended that you believe P.
Positional Recommendation 2: To the extent that believing 
P will harm you, it is recommended that you not believe 
16 Perhaps strict permission is the wrong deontic category. If so, a natural al-
ternative would be Belief’s Rule of Discouragement: You ought to believe P 
only if believing P is useful. Another weaker alternative is Belief’s Rule of  
Recommendation: It is recommended that you believe P only if believing P 
is useful.
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P.
What are that rules of inquiry, beginning with attention man-
agement? Attention management is presumably characterized by at 
least a pair of rules:
Attention’s Imperfect Duty: Not infrequently, pose a ques-
tion.
Attention’s Rule of Permission: You may pose a question 
only if its answer matters.17
Once attention management has played its role, cognition begins.
What are the rules of cognition? It’s doubtful that we break the 
rules of cognition by not answering every question posed. Neverthe-
less, there is an expectation that questions will be answered most of  
the time. This suggests that the duty is imperfect but still stringent,  
such that you’re required to usually answer. Add to this that cogni-
tion aims at providing true answers and avoiding false ones, and a 
plausible pair of rules suggests itself:
Cognition’s Imperfect Duty: Usually when the question 
whether P is posed, form a belief that P, or form a belief 
that not-P.
Cognition’s Rule of Permission: You may form a belief only 
if it is true.
Just as the merry men achieved the goal of Robin Hoodery by 
achieving what Robin’s Rules prescribe, so too will we achieve the 
17 Again, I’m open to the possibility of replacing ‘may’ with ‘ought’ or ‘should’, 
and also to the suggestion that the rule is better understood as a stringent  
imperfect duty, placing restrictions only on the overall ratio of useful to 
non-useful questions asked.
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goal of belief management by achieving what the rules prescribe. In  
the case of cognition, true beliefs are prescribed, so we achieve true 
beliefs. We are naturally equipped with powers of perception, are 
disposed to trust the word of others, and are habituated to make 
certain inferences. These are powers we have for achieving true be-
liefs: powers of detection and discovery. Some truths are harder 
won than others, but in a wide range of typical cases we can more or  
less directly achieve true beliefs through the exercise of these 
powers.
I am offering a view about the rules that normatively sustain  
practices. This does not commit me to the view that actions that oc-
cur within a practice are themselves made possible by the practice’s  
rules, or indeed by any rules at all. Even if the rules of belief man -
agement pertain to the activities of questioning and believing, it 
does not follow that either questioning or believing is made pos-
sible by these rules, or that they could occur only in the context of  
such a practice. To the contrary, one might argue that inquiry man-
agement aims to manage the antecedently given activities of ques-
tioning and believing. In any event, here I am not taking a definite 
stand on whether questioning or believing can or must be meta-
physically grounded in a prior practice.
9. Knowledge and belief management
If what I have said thus far is on the right track, then in light of an  
important result from recent epistemology, we learn something im-
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portant about the relationship between knowledge and belief man-
agement. First I’ll explain the result from recent epistemology. 
Then I’ll explain what this entails about knowledge’s relationship to 
belief management.
It has recently been persuasively argued that to know just is to 
achieve true belief.18 This thesis has been defended on a wide range 
of grounds, including the following: it provides a simple, elegant 
and extensionally adequate definition of knowledge, it solves the 
Gettier problem,19 it underwrites a compelling account of epistemic 
value, and it helps explain why knowledge is the norm of assertion. 
This is not the place to review these arguments. I am convinced that 
they succeed and for present purposes I will assume that they do. 
Now suppose that the rules of cognition prescribe acquiring 
true beliefs. And suppose that it is by achieving what the rules pre-
scribe that we sustain a practice. Thus it is by achieving true belief 
that we achieve the goals of cognition and thereby sustain the prac -
tice. So since achieving true belief just is knowing, it is by knowing 
that we sustain the practice of cognition and, in turn, inquiry.  
Knowing is the only way to do this. It is by knowing, and by know-
ing alone, that we hold the practice together.
Knowledge is not the goal of belief management. The sustaining 
rules of belief management don’t mention knowledge. But know-
18 Sosa 2007, Greco 2010, Turri 2011a, Turri in press a. Important historical 
antecedents include Aristotle, Descartes and Reid.
19 This includes so-called “fake barn” cases, which many philosophers catego-
rize as Gettier cases. For further discussion and review of relevant litera-
ture, see Turri 2011a; Turri, Buckwalter and Blouw 2015; Blouw, Buckwal-
ter and Turri in press; and Turri in press b.
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ledge still plays a unique and essential role: it is the constitutive 
means and sustenance of cognition and inquiry.20
It is widely believed that there is an important normative con-
nection between belief and knowledge.21 I have proposed one spe-
cial way that knowledge sets the normative standard for belief:  
knowing is essentially the unique way of normatively sustaining 
cognition and, thereby, inquiry. Knowing is the constitutive means 
and sustenance of these central practices of belief management. Of 
course, there are other belief management practices, such as posi-
tion management, where knowledge does not play this role, and I  
have said nothing about whether knowledge is a norm of belief it-
self, independently of any practice of managing beliefs. But that is  
consistent with knowledge playing a special and unique normative 
role in our practices of cognition and inquiry.
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